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BOOK REVIEW
THE VALUE OF DISSENT
Lawrence B. Solumt
DIssENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANINGS OF AmmlcA. By Steven H.
Shiffin.tt Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999. Pp. 204.
$29.95.
INTRODUCION: THE FAILURE OF FREE SPEECH THEORY
Theorizing about the freedom of speech has been a central enter-
prise of contemporary legal scholarship. The important contributions
to the debate are simply far too numerous to categorize.' One ambi-
tion of this theorizing is the production of a comprehensive theory of
the freedom of expression, a set of consistent normative principles
that would explain and justify First Amendment doctrine.2 Despite an
outpouring of scholarly effort, the consensus is that free speech the-
ory has failed to realize this imperial ambition.3 Rather than search-
t Professor of Law and William M. Rains Fellow, Loyola Law School. BA. 1981, Uni-
versity of California, Los Angeles; J.D. 1984, Harvard Law School.
-- Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. BA- 1963, Loyola Marymount University;
MA. 1964, San Fernando Valley State College; J.D. 1975, Loyola Law School.
1 See, e.g., C. EDwIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1989); LEE C.
BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SocimT (1986); ALEXANDER MEKLEJoHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM
(1965); FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY (1982); CASS R. SUN-
STEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993); Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a
General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE LJ. 877 (1963).
2 See U.S. CONST. amend. I. The idea that legal theories can explain and justify legal
practice is a central tenet of Ronald Dworkin's approach to the theory ofjudicial decision
making. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 115-18 (1978).
3 See Edward J. Eberle, Practical Reason: The Commercial Speech Paradigm, 42 CASE W.
RES. L. Rxv. 411, 414-15 (1992); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Practical Reason and
the First Amendment 34 UCLA L. REv. 1615, 1615-16 (1987); Steven Shiffrin, The First Amend-
ment and Economic Regulation: Away from a General Theory of the First Amendmen, 78 Nw. U. L.
Rxv. 1212, 1212 (1983). Ronald Cass's critique of grand theorizing about the First Amend-
ment well represents this position:
[N]o single value or interest explains the speech clause and no simple
formula can implement it. The negative approach also takes the various
values not as freestanding goals but as bases for the concerns that support
limitations on government.
The appropriate theoretical effort, on this view, is not the construction
of "global" models, but the creation of "local" solutions to particular speech
problems and the linkage of these solutions by broadly applicable
principles.
Ronald A. Cass, The Perils of Positive Thinking. Constitutional Interpretation and Negative First
Amendment Theory, 34 UCLA L. Rxv. 1405, 1490 (1987).
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ing for the global theory of the First Amendment, constitutional
scholars are content to aim for a local theory; offering partial concep-
tualizations, local theories explain, justify, or critique some portion of
free speech doctrine without attempts at global synthesis.4
Steven Shiffrin's Dissent, Injustice, and the Meanings of America5
(hereinafter Dissent) stands squarely in the tradition of modest, local-
ized theorizing about the freedom of speech. Rather than attempting
to integrate all of free speech doctrine, he focuses on one free speech
value: the value of dissent and its contribution to the illumination of
particular First Amendment problems.6 This compact, densely ar-
gued, and brilliantly insightful book leaves free speech theory far the
richer. Shiffrin has important things to say about flag burning,7 adver-
tising,8 and racist speech. 9 Moreover, Dissent addresses a topic that is
all too often neglected by free speech theorists: the methods by which
institutions other than courts, such as schools and the media, can pro-
mote the values of free speech. 10 Throughout, Dissent never loses
4 To be more precise about the distinction between local and global theories, we
might say that global theories aim to provide a normative and descriptive account that
"fits" and "justifies" (to use Ronald Dworkin's terminology) a whole domain of law, such as
the whole of free speech doctrine; on the other hand, local theories aim only to explain
and provide normative foundations for some subset of the domain, like free speech doc-
trine as it applies to dissent. DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 115-18 (explaining how legal theo-
ries aim to "fit" and "justify" legal doctrine). The ultimate global theory would fit and
justify the law as a whole, reflecting the notion that the law is or should be treated as a
"seamless web." Id. at 115-16; see RoNALD DWORMaN, LAW's EMPiE 289-40, 264, 354, 379-91
(1986); Ronald Dworkin, No Right Answer2, in LAw, MoRAry, AND SocIETy 58, 84 (P.M.S.
Hacker &J. Raz eds., 1977).
Particular legal theories lie along a spectrum from theories that are fully global (tak-
ing the law as a whole as their object) to theories that are strongly local (taking, at the
extreme, only a single application of a particular legal rule as the legal phenomenon to be
explained or justified). Relative to theories of the law as a whole or theories of all free
speech doctrine, Shiffrin's views can be said to be local; but if compared to theories that
address only a particular aspect of free speech doctrine, Shiffrin's theory might be said to
be global by comparison. For an example of an approach to free speech doctrine that can
be said to be relatively more localized than Shiffrin's, see Marcy Strauss, Redefining the Cap-
tive Audience Doctrine, 19 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 85 (1991).
Different theorists use the distinction between local and global theories differently,
but the sense in which they use the terms is closely related to common usage in contempo-
rary legal theory. See Cass, supra note 3, at 1490 (distinguishing local and global free
speech theories); see alsojohn Stick, Formalism as the Method of Maximally Coherent Classifica-
tion, 77 IowA L. Rxv. 773, 784 (1992) (distinguishing between global and local theories of
tort law); Adrian Vermeule,Judicial History, 108YALE L.J. 1311, 1350-51 (1999) (distinguish-
ing between global and local theories of legal history).
5 STEVEN H. SHIFFRdN, DISSENT, INJUSnCE, AND THE MEANINGS OF Am cucA (1999).
6 See id. at xi.
7 See id. at 4-18.
8 See id. at 32-48.
9 See id. at 49-87.
10 See id. at 112-20.
860 [Vol. 85:859
THE VALUE OF DISSENT
sight of its central thesis: The value of dissent is essential to under-
standing the freedom of speech."
If free speech theories should not be too ambitious, then neither
should they be too modest. If Dissent has a flaw, it is that Shiffrin does
not push his argument far enough to weave a tapestry with sufficient
breadth and depth to allow us to see the relationship between a local
theory of dissent and the whole landscape of free speech jurispru-
dence. At times, the threads of argument developed in Dissent seem
truncated, leaving the reader uncertain as to whether a consistent vi-
sion exists. 12 Dissentwould have been a more satisfying work if Shiffrin
had developed the central theoretical concepts in more depth and
then applied them to a broader range of particular problems in free
speech theory. Notwithstanding this criticism, no one who gives Dis-
sent the attention it deserves can fail to appreciate the strong vision of
social justice and deep knowledge of free speech doctrine that perme-
ate Shiffrin's fine book.
Part I of this Review provides a brief exposition of some of Shif-
fin's main points in Dissent. In Part II, I offer a critical analysis of
Dissents central theory that the promotion and protection of dissent
are central functions of the freedom of speech. In order to clarify
Shiffrin's central claims, I Will compare his analysis with John Stuart
Mill's famous defense of the liberty of expression in his essay On Lib-
erty.' 3 Part III concludes with some observations about the lessons to
be learned from Shiffrin's successes and failures.
11 See id. at xi-xii.
12 Dissent offers deep and sophisticated discussions of a variety of topics, but many of
them end without either advocating a position on the shape that doctrine should take or
integrating the discussion into a coherent view of free speech theory as a whole. For exam-
ple, the conclusions to the discussions of commercial speech, see id. at 48, racist speech, see
id. at 86-87, and campaign finance reform, see id. at 120, are more suggestive than program-
matic. This approach seems to be a deliberate choice on Shiffrin's part. In the conclusion
to Chapter Four with respect to the topic of campaign finance reform Shiffrin writes:
As I have said, I am content to provide this sketch without further elabora-
tion. Some readers might have preferred long discussions of these propos-
als, but most of them have been discussed pro and con by many others
elsewhere. Many of those readers may nonetheless experience a sense of
unease. There frequently is an unstated belief that if there is a problem,
there must be a tidy solution. I wonder how much of that unease is
prompted by a desire to believe that our society is more or less just, or
could be with only a few changes.
Id. at 120.
The acknowledgement of complexity is admirable, but the unavailability of simple so-
lutions hardly alleviates the need for the clear and comprehensive articulation of more
complex and nuanced positions. This reader would have felt less uneasy if Shiffrin had
tackled the complexities in detail rather than waving his hand at discussions "by many
others elsewhere."
13 JoHN STuART MILL, On Liberty, in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER EssAys (John Gray ed.,
1991).
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MEANING, DISSENT, INJUSTICE
Dissent, Injustice, and the Meanings of America continues a project
that has been a central focus of Shiffrin's scholarly career. As in his
prior book, The First Amendment, Democracy, and Romance,14 Shiffiin's
aim in Dissent is to explain the special relationship between the First
Amendment right to free speech and the social role of dissent in a
democratic society.
Dissent is a dense book that addresses many topics, with intricate
and nuanced examinations of Supreme Court opinions on a variety of
topics. This summary cannot hope to replicate Shiffrin's fine work.
My aim is rather to give a sense of the broad themes, with an occa-
sional focus on particular arguments by way of illustration. My expli-
cation of Dissent's argument begins with some preliminary points
concerning the definition and value of dissent and then proceeds to
survey Shiffrin's treatment of several problems in First Amendment
doctrine.
A. The Meaning and Value of Dissent
Dissent is the key concept in Dissent, Injustice, and the Meanings of
America. It is therefore surprising that Shiffrin gives only scant atten-
tion to its meaning. He defines dissent as "speech that criticizes ex-
isting customs, habits, traditions, institutions, or authorities." 15 In his
discussion of racist speech, Shiffrin characterizes dissent as a "popu-
larly disdained view[ ],"'6 and in his discussion of commercial speech,
he suggests that tobacco advertising is not dissent, because it "is no
part of a social practice that challenges unjust hierarchies with the
prospect of promoting progressive change."17 These definitions may
not be consistent, a theme that I will take up later in this Review.' 8
In order to better understand this theory, we need to remind our-
selves of the foundation that Shiffrin lays in his important work on
free speech theory that preceded Dissent. Why is dissent valuable? The
First Amendment, Democracy, and Romance, identifies a set of interlocking
values that the promotion and protection of dissent serve. Dissent fos-
ters community or "engaged association" rather than atomistic indi-
vidualism, because "[dlissenters seek converts and colleagues."' 9
Indeed, dissenters are critics of the excesses of individualistic material-
14 STEVEN H. SHimwRn, THE FIRsT AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE (1990).
15 SHIURIN, supra note 5, at xi.
16 Id. at 77.
17 Id. at 42.
18 See infra Part II1.
19 SHImFaN, supra note 14, at 91.
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ism that permeates American culture.20 Moreover, dissent fosters the
emergence of truth.21 Shiffrin makes this claim despite his acknowl-
edgement that "[d]issenters are often wrong."22 Central to his argu-
ment is the notion that truth does not necessarily prevail in the
marketplace of ideas, and therefore that active promotion of dissent
may be necessary to create "a robust, burgeoning marketplace." 23 But
the greatest value of dissent is "that the sponsoring and protection of
dissent generally have progressive implications" for social change be-
cause "[d]issent communicates the fears, hopes, and aspirations of the
less powerful to those in power."24
B. Identity, Culture, and the Freedom of Speech
Part I of Dissent, entitled "The Meanings of America," argues that
the meaning of First Amendment freedom of speech is intertwined
with cultural struggles and identity politics: "[T]he First Amendment
itself is at the heart of America's cultural struggle."25 The role that
the constitutional right to free speech plays in struggles over Ameri-
can culture is illustrated by debates over government funding for so-
called blasphemous art and by the flag burning cases. Shiffrin points
to Justice Brennan's opinion in Texas v. Johnson,26 the leading flag
burning case, for its expression of "the 'bedrock principle... that the
Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply be-
cause society finds the idea offensive or disagreeable.'1, 27 Shfffrin ze-
ros in on the key notion of Brennan's principle: Freedom of speech
protects ideas,28 a doctrinal legacy of Justice Holmes's marketplace-of-
ideas theory.29 But, Shiffrin argues, the marketplace is flawed: "What
emerges in the market might better be viewed as a testimonial to
power than as a reflection of truth."30 The real point of the flag burn-
ing case is symbolic: "[T] he American community is committed to the
notion that dissent should be protected, and the First Amendment is
the legal manifestation of that cultural commitment."31
Shiffrin continues his investigation of the meanings of America
by examining the Supreme Court's commercial speech jurispru-
20 See id. at 93.
21 See id. at 96.
22 Id. at 95.
23 Id.
24 Id at 96.
25 SHIF-MN, supra note 5, at 3.
26 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
27 SHIFMruN, supra note 5, at 5 (quoting Johnson, 491 U.S. at 414).
28 Id. at 6.
29 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J, dissenting).
30 SHIFFRN, supra note 5, at 6.
31 Id. at 18.
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dence3 2 and in particular its decision in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode
Island,33 which struck down Rhode Island's prohibition of liquor price
advertising.3 4 Shifftin argues against such protection, stating that
"[c] ommercial advertisers are not dissenters."35 Or are they? Shiffrin
recognizes the complication that "tobacco advertising has some ele-
ments of dissent," because the products advertised are "socially stigma-
tized. '36 However, he contends that because "tobacco advertising
misses vital elements ordinarily associated with our valuing of dis-
sent, '37 it "is no part of a social practice that challenges unjust hierar-
chies with the prospect of promoting progressive change."38
But why does tobacco advertising not promote progressive social
change? One might argue that prohibitions on tobacco advertising
are unjust restrictions on individual freedom, because they violate
John Smart Mill's famous liberty principle: "That the only purpose for
which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civi-
lized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His
own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. 3 9 Of
course, Mill's theory is controversial,40 and he may well be wrong. In
fact, the prevailing opinion surely is that he is wrong, although there
are dissenters. 41 But trying to settle such controversies as a matter of
First Amendment theory seems strange. It seems odd to claim that
the question of whether tobacco advertising should receive First
Amendment protection hinges on whether a libertarian approach to
harmful substances represents progressive social change.42
32 See id. at 32-48.
33 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
34 See id. at 489.
35 S-nsFNi', supra note 5, at 41.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 42.
39 MILL, supra note 13, at 14. I am setting aside questions regarding second-hand
smoke. One Milan approach would be to directly regulate second-hand smoke, for exam-
ple, by prohibiting smoking in public places, in the workplace, and even at home in the
presence of children.
40 Questions about the proper limits of government authority are among the most
controversial in political philosophy, and Mill's views in particular have been hotly con-
tested, beginning with his contemporary critics and extending through today. See Benja-
min R. Barber, The Market as Censor: Freedom of Expression in a World of Consumer Totalism, 29
Aiuz. ST. L.J. 501, 503 (1997) (discussing a debate between Mill andJames FitzJames Ste-
phen as it has been reflected in a more contemporary debate between H.L.A. Hart and
Lord Devlin); Stephen Gardbaum, Liberalism, Autonomy, and Moral Conflict, 48 STAN. L. Rxv.
385, 393 (1996) (discussing Mill's and Kant's "ideals of autonomy and individualism" as
'paradigmatic examples of controversial comprehensive conceptions of the good").
41 See, e.g., RANDY E. BAiNrTr, THE STRucrupm OF LIBERTY 326 (1998) (advocating a
contemporary libertarian theory of the proper role of government).
42 I will take up this oddity again in Part II of this Review.
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Shiffxin concludes his investigation of the meanings of America
with an illuminating discussion of racist speech and the Supreme
Court's decision in RA.V v. City of St. PauL43 By taking up this topic,
Shiffrin fills a noted gap in his prior work on dissent and the freedom
of speech.44 He contends that "the argument that First Amendment
values ... dictate that racist speech cannot be regulated is ultimately
indefensible."45 Shiffrin argues thatJustice Scalia's opinion in R.A.V.
is ultimately motivated by "a particular vision of America-as a nation
that spurns paternalism and tolerates different points of view, however
hateful."46 Scalia's proposed alternative to the St. Paul ordinance that
targeted only fighting words based on race, creed, color, or gender
was a content-neutral fighting-words ordinance, which lacks "symbolic
power."47
Shiffrin proposes that we tell a different story about the St. Paul
ordinance-one that focuses on dissent. A dissent-based approach to
hate speech, however, is complicated. Shiffrin recognizes the
difficulties:
Because both aggressors and victims [of racist speech] can be
characterized, with some accuracy, as dissenters, the dissent story
underscores the difficulty of the First Amendment status of racist
speech. On the one hand, the dissent perspective seeks to protect
those with popularly disdained views and, in an important respect,
this includes those who publicly express racist views. On the other
hand, the dissent perspective seeks to assure that those who are out
of power or lower in a hierarchy have the means to protest their
status and to combat the inevitable abuses of power by higher-ups.
A regime that is blind to the importance of assuring that disadvan-
taged groups are not intimidated will contain, as its status quo, sub-
stantial corruption and abuse. 48
Shiffrin then suggests that this conflict should be resolved against First
Amendment protection for racist speech.49 Because racist speech de-
nies the equality of all persons, it "makes a negative 'contribution' to
public political dialogue."50 Although racist speech alerts us to the
existence of racism in society, "the best test of truth is the system's
43 505 U.S. 377 (1992); see SHIriuN, supra note 5, at 49.
44 See Nicholas Wolfson, Free Speech Theoiy and Hateful Words, 60 U. CIN. L. REv. 1, 11
n.49 (1991) (noting that Shiffrin avoided the topic of hate speech in The First Amendment,
Democracy, and Romance).
45 SHIFMN, supra note 5, at 50.
46 Id. at 64.
47 Id. at 65.
48 Id. at 77.
49 See id.
50 Id. at 78.
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foundational premise of equality, not whether racist speech can
emerge triumphant in the marketplace of ideas."51
C. Injustice and the Role of Dissent
The second part of Dissent focuses on the role of dissent in com-
bating injustice. Shiffrin opens with the following claim: "Free speech
theory should be taken beyond protecting or tolerating dissent: the
First Amendment should be taken to reflect a constitutional commit-
ment to promoting dissent."52 Why? The answer is that "dissent is nec-
essary to combat injustice."53 Injustice is the ordinary condition of
human societies, because those with power tend to protect their privi-
leges. 54 Shiffrin explains that "[d]issent attacks existing customs, hab-
its, traditions, institutions, and authorities," and "[i]t spies injustice
and brings it to light."5 5
Shiffrin's abstract statement of these claims leaves many impor-
tant questions outside the scope of his inquiry. What conception of
justice is being assumed? How is that conception justified? What so-
cial theory leads to the conclusion that dissent can be efficacious in
combating injustice? A fuller telling of Shiffrin's First Amendment
story would encompass these questions, but Dissent elides them.
1. Dissent and Political Liberalism
Shiffrin does make one significant foray into philosophical theo-
ries ofjustice in support of his position. He argues that fostering dis-
sent is consistent with the deep principles of John Rawls's Political
Liberalism,5 6 despite some evidence to the contrary in Rawls's own
statement of his theory.57 This argument is worth examining in
depth, because it reveals something of the deep structure of Shiffrin's
own views.
In Political Liberalism, Rawls addresses the question of stability in a
just society.58 This question arises because a just society, with liberty
of conscience and with freedom of speech and association, will be
characterized by reasonable pluralism.59 In other words, ajust society
will include citizens who affirm a variety of comprehensive moral and
philosophical doctrines. For example, some citizens might affirm a
variety of religious perspectives, philosophical doctrines such as utili-
51 Id.
52 Id. at 91.
53 Id.
54 See id.
55 Id. at 93.
56 JoHN RAWLS, PoLrrIcAL LIBERAUSM (1996).
57 See SHnIURN, supra note 5, at 93-95.
58 See RAWLS, supra note 56, at xviii-xix.
59 See id. at xvii.
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tarianism or Kantianism, and other viewpoints. How can such a plu-
ralist society be stable? Would the various groups not contend with
one another, each group seeking to impose its own comprehensive
views on the others? Rawls's answer is the notion of an "overlapping
consensus," whereby stability is achieved when each group affirms the
basic principles ofjustice from its own comprehensive point of view.60
Catholics might affirm principles of justice from within a natural law
tradition, while Kantians might affirm the same principles on the basis
of their contribution to individual autonomy.
With this background in mind, consider Shiffrin's argument.
Shiffrin claims that if Rawls were to address the question,61 he would
endorse a constitutional theory that encourages dissent but "might
confine such encouragement to a narrow conception of political injus-
tice. '62 Some explanation is in order here. Rawls's theory ofjustice is
"narrow," to use Shiffrin's term, in the sense that Rawls confines it to
the topic ofjustice and the realm of the political. Rawls does not ad-
dress deep questions about the ultimate nature of the good, the truth
of religion, and so forth. If Rawls's theory were to take a stand on
such issues, it would go beyond "public reason"63 and hence violate
"the liberal principle of legitimacy,"64 which states that "our exercise
of political power is proper and hence justifiable only when it is exer-
cised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citi-
zens may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles
and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and rational."65
A theory of justice that rested on a comprehensive doctrine
would be regarded as illegitimate by those whose deepest beliefs were
incompatible with that doctrine. For example, we could not expect a
religious citizen to endorse basic principles of justice on the basis of a
comprehensive secular doctrine that denies the existence of God. A
similar principle operates with respect to the use of state power to
inculcate particular belief systems. A Rawlsian state could not use the
public schools to favor any particular comprehensive doctrine,
whether it be religious or secular. The public schools could, however,
be used to reinforce the public values of equality, tolerance, and so
forth. Shiffrin disagrees with Rawls at this point:
60 See id. at 133-72.
61 Shiffrin notes that Rawls does not address this question because, as Rawls explains,
it belongs to "'political sociology'" and not political philosophy. SHIFMRN, supra note 5, at
94 (quotingJoIN RAWLS, A THEORY oFJusncE 226-27 (1971)); see RAwLS, supra note 56, at
327.
62 SHIFFMIN, supra note 5, at 94.
63 RAxWS, supra note 56, at 213-16.
64 Id. at 217.
65 Id.
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Rawls would not permit the state to use its educational process or
other means to promote citizens who prize autonomous decision
making. On Rawls's understanding, this would constitute endorse-
ment of a comprehensive conception of the good, which a just and
stable state is not permitted to do. If one believes, however, that
injustice is a permanent feature of even democratic societies, en-
couraging autonomous decision makers is a prescription for justice
and its maintenance, not an endorsement of a comprehensive con-
ception of the good.6 6
Quite a lot is packed into this brief passage, and careful explication is
required if we are to get at the heart of Shiffrin's disagreement with
Rawls.
Initially, we must discuss a minor difference between the basic
goals of Shiffrin and Rawls. Rawls's enterprise is an exercise in devel-
oping an "ideal theory"-principles of justice to regulate a society
which would comply with them.67 Shiffrin's work clearly addresses
problems of nonideal theory: the problems of justice that arise in a
society that is not in compliance with the requirements ofjustice. To
some extent, the disagreement between Shiffrin and Rawls may stem
from this difference in aim.
This minor point about ideal theory, however, does not capture
the most significant disagreement between Rawls and Shiffrin. Shif-
frin wants the state to promote dissent as a way of life. For example,
he wants the educational system to encourage the formation of citi-
zens who prize autonomy as a fundamental value. 68 Rawls also en-
dorses autonomy as a value, but the autonomy that plays a role in
Rawlsian theory is political autonomy and not ethical autonomy.
Rawls explains:
Here I stress that full autonomy is achieved by citizens: it is a
political and not an ethical value. By that I mean that it is realized
in public life by affirming the political principles ofjustice and en-
joying the protections of the basic rights and liberties; it is also real-
ized by participating in society's public affairs and sharing in its
collective self-determination over time. This full autonomy of polit-
ical life must be distinguished from the ethical values of autonomy
and individuality, which may apply to the whole of life, both social
and individual, as expressed by the comprehensive liberalisms of
Kant and Mill. Justice as fairness emphasizes this contrast: it affirms
political autonomy for all but leaves the weight of ethical autonomy
to be decided by citizens severally in light of their comprehensive
doctrines. 69
66 SHIFFRIN, supra note 5, at 94-95 (footnotes omitted).
67 RAWIs, supra note 56, at 285.
68 See SHIFFRIN, supra note 5, at 112-15.
69 RAWLS, supra note 56, at 77-78.
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What then is the nature of the disagreement between Shiffrin and
Rawls? Pinning Shiffrin down on this score is not easy.
Perhaps Shiffrin means to endorse comprehensive liberalism as a
matter of ethical theory. Under this interpretation, Shiffrin would be
stressing the role of dissent in promoting individual self-development
and ethical community. If so, then his view ofjustice is fundamentally
at odds with Rawls's view. Perhaps Shiffrin takes political justice as his
goal but disagrees with Rawls about the means for achieving it. Shif-
frin may believe that ajust society can exist only if the state promotes
comprehensive liberalism. Why might Shiffrin believe this? One pos-
sibility is that, in Shiffin's view, only ethically autonomous individuals
are capable of making the arguments and taking the actions that will
promote social justice. If this interpretation is correct, then a major
gap exists in Shiffrin's argument, because he does not provide any
backing for this ambitious claim.
2. Education and Dissent
One of the most interesting and attractive features of Dissent is
closely related to Shiffrin's encounter with Rawls. Shiffrin argues that
"[a]ny society committed to encouraging dissent must begin its en-
couragement in its system of education." 70 Current educational prac-
tice, Shiffrin claims, encourages conformity and not dissent.71 The
pledge of allegiance to the flag and textbook definitions of good citi-
zenship are evidence that schools "give lip service to" autonomy and
dissent, but do not give them real emphasis. 72 Shiffrin suggests that
schools should require courses in argument and debate and should
incorporate skills in critical assessment of the media.73 Students
should be taught to identify and challenge injustice in their own com-
munities.74 Besides education, Shiffrin targets the practice ofjournal-
ism and access to the media.75
We should surely applaud Shiffrin's move beyond legal doctrine
to the institutions that shape public culture. If anything, Shiffrin
should have devoted even more attention to these topics. As a practi-
cal matter, how can we accomplish institutional reform given Shif-
frin's views about the entrenched hierarchy of those in power? At first
blush, to hope that the public schools will train students to attack in-
justice in their local communities seems utopian. Whereas judges,
and hence free speech doctrine, are at least to some degree insulated
70 SmriumN, supra note 5, at 113.
71 Se d.
72 Id. at 112-13.
73 See id. at 114.
74 See id.
75 See id. at 115-17.
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from political pressure, the same cannot be said of local school
boards. If encouraging dissent requires the cooperation of political
institutions, then we need to know more about the politics of dissent.
How can dissent, which challenges existing institutions, become wel-
come and even promoted by them? Shiffrin seems to avoid questions
about the political practicality of his positions, but we cannot ignore
such a practical agenda if we are engaged in nonideal theory-the
enterprise of discerning the requirements ofjustice under real world
conditions in which institutions and individuals frequently act con-
trary to the requirements of justice.
3. Political Reality
Shiffrin does take up questions about political realism in the final
chapter of Dissent.7 6 He engages Frederick Schauer's argument that
"the commitment to free speech... tilts against those out of power."77
Schauer's argument, which Shiffrin dubs the "market capture thesis,"
contains three assumptions: (1) "the market is controlled by [forces
inimical to progressive change], (2) the free speech principle is a lais-
sez-faire principle, and (3) the free speech principle is harmful to
[progressive social change]."78 The upshot of Schauer's argument is
that liberal support for freedom of speech is actually counterproduc-
tive. The limits that free speech jurisprudence imposes on campaign
finance reform provide at least some support for Schauer's position.
Shiffrin disagrees with Schauer about the details. For example,
Shiffrin argues that political support for free speech is stronger today
than ever and that free speech doctrine, as exemplified by the flag
burning cases, supports dissent more.79 But the central focus of Shif-
frin's critique is the notion that the free speech principle is a laissez-
faire principle.8 0 Here Shiffrin reiterates his opposition to the mar-
ketplace-of-ideas metaphor;8' because the market fails, the free
speech principle should emphasize the promotion of dissent.8 2 Shif-
frin concedes that a conservative Supreme Court may interpret the
First Amendment in ways that do not favor the left, but insists that
freedom of speech "is an important cultural and political force of its
own wholly apart from the Court."83 For example, free speech values
76 See id. at 121-30.
77 Id. at 122; see Frederick Schauer, The Political Incidence of the Free Speech Principle 64
U. COLO. L. REv. 935 (1993).
78 SHIF RIN, supra note 5, at 122. I have reworded Shiffrin's summary of Schauer by
substituting "inimical to progressive social change" for "conservative."
79 See id. at 125-26.
80 See id. at 127.
81 See id. at 127-30.
82 See id. at 128.
83 Id. at 129.
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can foster grass-roots movements, such as the Free Speech Movement
at Berkeley.8 4
Surely, Shiffrin's position must contain some truth. Freedom of
speech plays a role in American political life that goes far beyond the
current state of First Amendment doctrine. It is an ideal that has the
power to move citizens and politicians, even when no threat ofjudicial
coercion is on the horizon.
Granting this point to Shiffrin, we might still wonder about the
real political efficacy of Shiffrin's dissent-based view of freedom of
speech. Social consensus about the value of the right to free speech is
likely to be strongest if and when the right is understood abstractly
and generally. But when freedom of speech begins to impinge on
important interests and to protect unpopular views, the political effi-
cacy of the free speech principle is, at the very least, in doubt. The
power of the free speech principle to inspire grass-roots movements
hardly guarantees that such movements will succeed. Indeed, to the
extent that the dissent-based theory of free speech emphasizes protec-
tion for despised and unpopular views, that theory might undermine,
rather than strengthen, the practical political effectiveness of free
speech rhetoric in enabling progressive political change. Of course,
my armchair speculation on this topic is really no more convincing
than Shiffrin's. My point is simply that such armchair speculation may
not be sufficient to make a convincing case one way or the other.
II
THE VALUE OF DISSENr
What is the value of dissent? One of Dissents central contribu-
tions to free speech theory is to lay this question squarely on the table.
In the course of developing his answer to this question, Shiffrin sub-
stantially contributes to our understanding of the role of dissent in
the emergence of truth. His penetrating criticisms of the market-
place-of-ideas theory should forever change the way that theory is
understood.
A. What Is Dissent?
At this point, I will take up the question that I put aside above.
What is dissent? Shiffrin offers a number of different, perhaps con-
flicting, formulations.85 Initially, he defines dissent as "speech that
criticizes existing customs, habits, traditions, institutions, or authori-
ties."86 Another definition focuses on the popular attitudes towards
84 See id. at 126.
85 See supra Part 1.A.
86 SHIFFRIN, supra note 5, at xi.
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the view contained in the speech: "[T]he dissent perspective seeks to
protect those with popularly disdained views .... ,,87 Finally, Shiffrin
defines dissent as "a social practice that challenges unjust hierarchies
with the prospect of promoting progressive change."88 Thus, we have
dissent as criticism of the status quo, dissent as the expression of un-
popular views, and dissent as the promotion of progressive social
change.
These three definitions of dissent are not consistent and are po-
tentially in conflict with one another. For example, speech that criti-
cizes existing institutions might be popularly acclaimed, or speech
that is popularly disdained might support rather than challenge un-
just hierarchies. Of course, the various elements of the definition of
dissent might be brought together in a variety of ways. In order to
assess and understand Shiffrin's argument, we need to investigate his
notion of dissent.
Shiffrin might resist this inquiry. Although he has recognized
that his readers may ask, "[W] hat precisely is dissent?,"8 9 he resists the
question. Such a difficult question is "placed at too high a level of
abstraction"90 and mistakenly assumes that dissent "ha[s] an es-
sence."9 ' To the extent he is forced to deal with the question, his
approach would be to ask "whether the values associated with dissent
are present" 92 with respect to the speech at issue. This approach, of
course, is familiar to students of American law. The realist critique of
formalism is associated with the move from formal, conceptual analy-
sis to consideration of underlying values or interests. But if this move
were taken to its logical conclusion, it would dissolve Shiffrin's focus
on dissent. Instead, we would focus on the role of a right to freedom
of speech in promoting community, truth, and progressive social
change-the values that Shiffrin identifies as the benefits of dissent.
87 Id. at 77.
88 Id. at 42.
89 SHIFFRIN, supra note 14, at 100.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 107. To discern what Shiffrin means here is difficult, because the term "es-
sence" has a variety of quite distinct senses. Thus, we might say that water has an essence:
that water has a certain microstructure-H 20-is a necessary property. Or we might say
that larks have certain essential properties, because all normally functioning larks fly and
have certain distinctive colorings. We might also say that the Dalai Lama has an essence,
because his soul possesses an ineffable mystical quality. Shiffrin's cavalier assumption that
dissent cannot have an essence seems to play off the third, quasi-mystical, sense of essence.
Shiffrin surely is not arguing that dissent cannot have an essence in the sense that for
speech to count as dissent it must have some set of properties. Shiffrin might hold the view
that all terms in natural languages lack essences in the sense of either definite criteria for
their application or a focal meaning from which secondary meanings deviate. But to see
how a respectable philosophy of language could incorporate such a view is difficult.
92 Id.
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If Shiffrin's book is to make its case, then dissent must be a meaning-
ful concept, one that stands apart from the values it serves.93
We might begin with Shiffrin's initial definition of dissent as
"speech that criticizes existing customs, habits, traditions, institutions,
or authorities."94 We can stipulate that the term "social practice" in-
cludes "existing customs, habits, traditions, institutions, or authori-
ties," the elements that Shiffrin includes in his definition. 95 An
additional step might be to stipulate that speech counts as criticism of
a social practice if it is a claim that a social practice (1) should be
changed, (2) because it (a) violates requirements of justice, (b) cre-
ates bad consequences, or (c) is an inefficacious means of achieving a
desirable social goal. This stipulation is intended to encompass social
criticism regardless of the underlying normative framework within
which the criticism occurs. Thus, a given social practice might be crit-
icized because it violates the moral rights of persons (a deontological
criticism), because it produces bad consequences, because it does not
efficiently achieve a socially desirable goal (a consequentialist criti-
cism), or because it has a degrading effect on the character of citizens
(a virtue-centered criticism). Let us call criticism of social practices
"social criticism." This classification allows us to summarize Shiffrin's
initial definition of dissent: Dissent is speech that engages in social
criticism.
How does dissent as social criticism relate to dissent as an unpop-
ular view? One can see that sometimes a connection exists between
93 Judge Richard Posner's opinion in Herrmann v. Cencom Cable Assocs., Inc., 999 F.2d
223 (7th Cir. 1993), expresses this pointwell. Cencom addresses the scope of a claim for the
purposes of the doctrine of res judicata. Posner's argument stands as a powerful indict-
ment of any attempt to avoid the definition of a legal category by resorting to direct refer-
ence to the values that the category serves:
We're all for pragmatism, but pragmatism is not an operational legal stan-
dard. Litigants and their lawyers are entitled to clearer guidance in an area
where a false step can result in the forfeiture of valuable legal rights than
generalities about practicality, convenience, similarities, and expectations
can furnish. It is not wrong to emphasize these as factors bearing on the
objectives of resjudicata. Knowledge of objectives is helpful, often vital, in
interpreting and applying rules. But objectives must not be confused with
criteria. Where certainty is at a premium, sound lawmaking requires the
setting forth of clear and definite criteria rather than a general directive to
decide each case in the manner that will maximize the attainment of the
law's objectives. The latter approach, carried to the extreme, would reduce
all law to an admonition to do what's right.
Id. at 226. Posner's point applies with particular force in the context of freedom of speech.
As in the case of claim preclusion, certainty is a premium in First Amendment freedom-of-
speech interpretation. A lack of certainty regarding the protection of speech may well
result in a chilling effect, and valuable speech may never be heard when the speaker can-
not be assured a valid First Amendment defense. If the concept of dissent is to guide First
Amendment doctrine, the law should establish definite criteria for what will count as
dissent.
94 SHIMRIN, supra note 5, at xi.
95 M
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the two. Frequently, popular public opinion supports existing social
practices; as a corollary, social criticism is frequently unpopular. This
connection, however, is not necessary. Some existing social institu-
tions may be unpopular, and hence criticism of them may be in ac-
cord with popular opinion. The income tax may be unpopular, and
criticism of it may be popular indeed. At any given point in time,
social practices may lag behind popular opinion, or elite decision
makers may ignore popular opinion. Let us assume for a moment
then that Shiffrin would limit the category of dissent to unpopular
social criticism.
The connection between unpopular social criticism and progres-
sive change is also tenuous. Unpopular social criticism comes from
both the left and the right. Feminists and chauvinists, white racists
and people of color, the rich and the poor, all engage in social criti-
cism. Shiffrin does not, as far as I can tell, offer an account of "pro-
gress," although the gist of his position is not difficult to discern:
progressive change is change in the direction of justice. Shiffrin's vi-
sion of social justice is concerned with the elimination of unjust dis-
crimination and the equitable distribution of economic resources and
social power. Some unpopular social criticism is progressive in Shif-
frin's sense, and some is anti-progressive. Shiffrin offers no good rea-
son to believe that unpopular social criticism is even more likely to be
progressive than other categories of speech. Let us assume, then, that
Shiffrin's concept of dissent is limited to unpopular progressive social
criticism.
Is this category attractive for the basis of a First Amendment the-
ory? Of course, what counts as progressive will be controversial. If
judges who apply the First Amendment to concrete cases apply their
own standards of justice to determine whether social criticism is pro-
gressive, then the Constitution will only protect unpopular speech
with which judges agree. Moreover, as judges tend to be drawn from
an elite and conservative segment of society, their conceptualization
of free speech doctrine is unlikely to serve an agenda that Shiffrin
would count as progressive. If Shiffrin were to insist that free speech
doctrine favor speech that Shiffrin himself considers progressive, it is
unlikely that this theory would find many adherents outside of the
group that concurs with Shiffrin about matters of justice. Others will
be tempted to see Shiffrin's theory of the freedom of speech as un-
principled;96 the speech that should receive special protection is sim-
ply speech with which Shiffrin agrees.
96 See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Howard M. Wasserman, What's Good for General Motors:
Corporate Speech and the Theoy of Free Expression, 66 GEo. WASH. L. Rv. 235, 294 (1998)
("The fact that ... Professor Shiffrin would deny protection to corporate speech while
simultaneously claiming to protect unpopular voices indicates that [his] approach protects
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If Shiffrin's definitions of dissent do not offer a workable theory
of freedom of speech, we might do well to consider his own sugges-
tion to look to the values served by dissent rather than the concept of
dissent. Perhaps by attending to those values, we will be able to recon-
struct a coherent and attractive dissent-based theory of the freedom of
speech.
B. Dissent and the Marketplace of Ideas
Why is dissent valuable? One tempting answer points to the im-
portant role that dissent has played in overcoming injustice, ranging
from the abolitionists to the civil rights movement, from the suffrag-
ettes to women's liberation, and from the labor movement to the anti-
war movement. But Shiffrin wants to avoid this temptation, because it
would transform a dissent-based theory of the freedom of expression
into a conventional marketplace-of-ideas theory. As Mark Tushnet
noted in his review of Shiffrin's The First Amendment, Democracy and
Romance, Shiffrin's attempt to link the value of dissent to its potential
for progressive change is difficult to maintain without collapsing into
a marketplace theory:
The difficulty is that Shiffrin needs to show that the general
culture places significant value on dissent per se, but most of the
examples of dissenters that come to mind-Martin Luther King, Jr.,
those who protested the war in Vietnam-are people whose dissent
turned out to be fight. These examples do not establish that the
general culture values dissent per se; rather, they demonstrate the
much more modest proposition that the culture values those ex-
pressions of dissent that, in the fullness of time, we now regard to
have been correct. One can of course make this proposition some-
what stronger by noting that, when the dissent occurs, no one can
be sure whether or not time will ultimately reveal its correctness,
and, therefore, we ought to respect dissent today despite the fact
that we disagree with its assertions. So transformed, the proposition
appears to be a rather standard Millian or marketplace defense of
free expression as a social process designed to achieve the best re-
sults in conditions of pervasive social uncertainty.97
Shifffrin emphatically rejects the notion that his theory is simply a
standard version of the marketplace of ideas. Quite to the contrary,
he believes that a dissent-based theory challenges the basic assump-
tions of the marketplace model.98 Is Shiffrin correct? The answer to
this question seems to depend on what one means by the marketplace
not all unpopular views but only the unpopular views with which... Professor Shiffrin
happen[s] to agree.").
97 Mark Tushnet, The Culture(s) of Free Expression, 76 CoRNELL L. REV. 1106, 1111-12
(1991) (book review) (citation omitted).
98 See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
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of ideas. If the marketplace-of-ideas theory implies that the current
dominant opinion must be true because people have accepted it in
the market, then Shiffrin's view is clearly not a marketplace theory.
However, if the marketplace-of-ideas theory has room for the notion
that current dominant opinion is false, either because of a market fail-
ure or because a new idea has not yet been accepted in the market,
then Shiffiin's view might be seen as consistent with a marketplace
theory.
Of course, the marketplace of ideas is only a metaphor. Ideas are
not literally bought and sold; no price mechanism exists. Ideas are
"bought" in the sense that people believe or accept them. Ideas are
"sold" in the sense that people advocate or offer them for considera-
tion. The notion that truth is promoted by allowing ideas to contend
with one another based on the assumption that free and fair competi-
tion among ideas will yield the truth is not inconsistent with the no-
tion that, under current social conditions, we do not have a free and
fair market. Indeed, the marketplace theory itself would predict that,
under conditions of market failure, the truth would not win out. The
fundamental premise that ideas should not be suppressed solely be-
cause we believe they are false does not preclude legislation or free
speech doctrine from seeking to create conditions under which com-
petition among ideas flourishes. We take the marketplace metaphor
too seriously if we assume that a free and fair marketplace of ideas
must somehow duplicate the perfect market of neoclassical
economics.
This argument, however, does not imply that Shiffrin is a market-
place theorist. The marketplace-of-ideas theory places value on free
speech because true ideas prevail under conditions of free and fair
discourse. Should we value dissent for reasons other than the possibil-
ity that dissent expresses true ideas that will facilitate progressive social
change? I will suggest thatJohn Stuart Mill's defense of the freedom
of expression offers support for an affirmative answer to this question.
C. Mill and the Value of False Dissent
John Stuart Mill's defense of the freedom of expression has surely
been the most influential statement on the subject in modem political
thought. Quoting Mill's own summary of the argument in full is
useful:
But the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is,
that it is robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing
generation; those who dissent from the opinion, still more than
those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the
opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what
876 [Vol. 85:859
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is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier im-
pression of truth, produced by its collision with error.99
Justice Brennan quoted a part of this passage in his majority opinion
in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,00 and legal scholars frequently cite it
as well.10' At this point, I want to emphasize that Mill offered two
distinct arguments for the freedom of expression. The first argument
is a conventional statement of the marketplace-of-ideas theory: If a
censored opinion is true, then censorship prevents the emergence of
the truth.'0 2 The second argument is quite different. Mill argues that
even if the censored opinion is "wrong," those who disagree with it are
deprived of a benefit almost as great as the truth: "the clearer percep-
tion and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with
error."
1 0 3
Mill's second argument for the freedom of discussion is one of
the most elegant in all of political philosophy:
However unwillingly a person who has a strong opinion may admit
the possibility that his opinion may be false, he ought to be moved
by the consideration that however true it may be, if it is not fully,
frequently, and fearlessly discussed, it will be held as a dead dogma,
not a living truth.10 4
Why does Mill affirm this conclusion? First, in the absence of confron-
tation with falsehood, truths will be held as mere opinions without
supporting reasons. Such beliefs become mere "prejudice," and "are
apt to give way before the slightest semblance of an argument." 05
Mill recognizes the objection that the grounds for truth could be
taught, without allowing for the expression of dissenting falsehoods.
But this approach is not sufficient, Mill argues, "when we turn... to
morals, religion, politics, social relations, and the business of life."10 6
With respect to these subjects, "three-fourths of the arguments for
every disputed opinion consist in dispelling the appearances which
favour some opinion different from it."1u 7 Mill's summary brilliantly
expresses the key argument: "He who knows only his own side of the
case, knows little of that."0 8
99 MmLL, supra note 13, at 21.
100 376 U.S. 254, 279 n.19 (1964). Later opinions represent a retreat from this Millian
view. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988) ("False statements of fact
are particularly valueless ... ."); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974)
("[T]here is no constitutional value in false statements of fact.").
101 See, e.g., BOLLNGER, supra note 1, at 54-55.
102 See Mini., supra note 13, at 21.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 40.
105 Id. at 41.
106 I& at 42.
107 Id.
108 Id.
2000] 877
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
Mill's argument offers Shiffrin a sound reply to the question that
Mark Tushnet posed: Why should we value dissent that turns out to be
erroneous? Because only in the day-to-day confrontation with error
does truth become a living conviction with a firm grip on belief and a
capacity to motivate action. Mill's two arguments form a complete
case for the protection of dissent. When dissent is true or partially
true, its suppression prevents the emergence of the truth. When dis-
sent is false, even completely false, its suppression clouds the meaning
of the truth and drains truth of its force. In either case, we have good
reason to value dissent.
With this point in mind, we can turn back to the question, What
is dissent? Recall that Shiffrin offered three different definitions of
dissent: dissent as an unpopular view, dissent as social criticism, and
dissent as advocacy of progressive social change. These definitions are
not equivalent, and we must define the relationships among them if
dissent is to be a meaningful concept. A simplistic reading of Shiffrin
might suggest that all three elements must be present for speech to
count as dissent, but this interpretation would be uncharitable as it
would yield a particularly unattractive theory of the freedom of
speech. A Millian account of the value of dissent suggests a formula-
tion that avoids the difficulties of Shiffrin's exposition.
In ordinary language, dissent has several different meanings. Dis-
sent may simply indicate disagreement. Whatever assertion you make,
the grammar of English permits me to respond, "I dissent." Call this
first form of dissent "dissent as disagreement." "Dissent" also is used
to refer to a minority point of view; for example, we refer to ajudge's
minority opinion in a multimember panel as a dissent. Call this sec-
ond form of dissent "dissent as minority viewpoint." Finally, "dissent"
sometimes is used in a more restrictive sense to define views that a
strong social consensus rejects. Those who held religious beliefs that
were in disagreement with the established Church in England or early
America were dissenters in this sense. Call this third form of dissent
"dissent as criticism of established opinion."
Mill's theory of the freedom of expression allows us to see why
each of these three forms of dissent is valuable. Mills theory also en-
ables us to understand why dissent as criticism of established opinion
should receive the most exacting protection from the courts and why
dissent as minority viewpoint needs more robust protection than mere
dissent as disagreement. In Mill's view, all disagreement has value,
because disagreement sharpens our understanding. Any view with
which we disagree could turn out to be the truth, whether a majority
or minority holds that view. Although censorship threatens minority
and majority views, minority viewpoints are more likely to be sup-
pressed both by the government in a majoritarian democracy and by
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informal social pressures, irrespective of the form of government. Fi-
nally, dissent as criticism of established opinion is even more in need
of First Amendment protection. Such speech is likely to be especially
valuable. If the speech is true, it needs protection in order to be able
to challenge and overcome established views. If it is false, it needs
protection so that the established truth can be more than mere
dogma. The confrontation between established truth and dissenting
falsehood is the means by which established truths are deeply compre-
hended and given firm foundations.
D. Pluralism, Liberty of Conscience, and Dissent
The confrontation between Shiffrin and Rawls points to one final
piece in the puzzle about the value of dissent. Recall that Rawls's the-
ory is premised on "the fact of pluralism"-the fact that a "plurality of
conflicting, and indeed incommensurable, conceptions of the mean-
ing, value and purpose of human life" exists.10 9 This pluralism is a
permanent feature of a society committed to freedom of thought and
discussion. It results from what Rawls calls "the burdens of judg-
ment."110 Rawls argues that disagreement about such matters, as
about the nature of the good or ultimate value, is reasonable given the
difficulties of arriving at a consensus about them. These difficulties
include the following: complex and conflicting evidence, disagree-
ment about what is relevant and about how to weigh relevant consid-
erations, the underdeterminacy introduced by hard cases, and the fact
that different kinds of normative arguments may exist on both sides of
a moral question."' The following factor is particularly important:
To some extent (how great we cannot tell) the way we assess evi-
dence and weigh moral and political values is shaped by our total
experience, our whole course of life up to now; and our total exper-
iences must always differ. Thus, in a modern society with its numer-
ous offices and positions, its various divisions of labor, its many
social groups and their ethnic variety, citizens' total experiences are
disparate enough for their judgments to diverge, at least to some
degree, on many if not most cases of any significant complexity.112
Given the burdens of reason, we should expect citizens to disagree
about many moral and political questions. Thus, the pluralism that
characterizes modern democratic societies is a reasonable
pluralism. 113
109 John Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, 7 OxFoRD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4
(1987); see also Lawrence B. Solum, Faith and Justice 39 DEPAUL L. REv. 1083, 1087-89
(1990) (affirming Rawls's "fact of pluralism").
110 RAWLs, supra note 56, at 54.
111 See id. at 56-57.
112 Id
113 But not all disagreement is reasonable.
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What is the relevance of pluralism and the burdens of judgment
to our question about the value of dissent? If we are committed to the
liberty of conscience and the freedom of discussion, then dissent is
inevitable with respect to the normative evaluation of social practice:
"customs, habits, traditions, institutions, or authorities."" 4 Citizens
who disagree about fundamental matters, such as religion and the na-
ture of the good, will evaluate social practices. Inevitably, some citi-
zens will dissent on almost any question of public policy or social
mores." 5 Given this fact, it follows that respect for the political auton-
omy of citizens requires the toleration of dissent. From the perspec-
tive of political liberalism, dissent is not the price to be paid for liberty
of conscience and freedom of discussion. Rather, dissent is to be cele-
brated as one of the great benefits of such freedom. Dissent is the
product of human reason operating under conditions of freedom.
Moreover, as Mill teaches us, dissent on contestable matters of
"morals, religion, politics, social relations, and the business of life"" 6
is properly seen as a great benefit by those who disagree with the
dissenters.
CONCLUSION: LESSONS FOR FREE SPEECH DocruNE
By way of conclusion, I shall examine the implications of Mill's
defense of the freedom of discussion for Shiffrin's account of hate
speech. Recall that Shiffrin ultimately rejects the notion that racist
speech should be protected as dissent despite the fact that, under cur-
rent social conditions, racist speech is frequently the speech of an un-
popular minority and hence presents a dissenting point of view.
Although racists have views that are popularly disdained, Shiffrin
maintains that the law should not protect these views, because they do
not promote progressive social change." 7
114 SIMFUN, supra note 5, at xi.
115 Rawls believes that reaching an overlapping consensus regarding principles ofjus-
tice is possible. See RAWLs, supra note 56, at 134. Thus, in a Rawlsian well-ordered society,
arguably no dissent on these matters would exist. Three points should be kept in mind
with respect to this issue. First, the scope of topics on which reasonable citizens can agree
is likely to be quite narrow, limited to what Rawls calls the "constitutional essentials." Id. at
137. Second, not every rational member of society will be "reasonable" in Raws's sense.
Some competent adults will reject the principles of justice. Rawis's theory requires that
this group not be so large as to undermine the stability of a well-ordered society, but his
theory does not require that no dissent exist on the constitutional essentials. Given Rawls's
conception of the burdens ofjudgment, dissent on such matters seems inevitable, even in
the case of a well-ordered society considered from the perspective of ideal theory. Third,
First Amendment theory is a nonideal theory; that is, a theory of First Amendment free-
dom of speech necessarily takes our actual society as its object. In our society, no overlap-
ping consensus on principles ofjustice exists, and given the conditions of our society and
the burdens of judgment, dissent on matters ofjustice is likely to be widespread.
116 MiL, supra note 13, at 42.
117 See SHIFFIN, supra note 5, at 78.
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We are now in a position to examine Shiffrin's key arguments
against the protection of racist dissent. Shiffrin argues that racist
speech makes no significant contribution to truth: "[T]he best test of
truth is the system's foundational premise of equality, not whether ra-
cist speech can emerge triumphant in the marketplace of ideas."118
Assuming that Shiffrin's premise is true-that racist speech is certainly
false" 9-does it follow that racist dissent has no value? Mill would
surely argue that it does. Through confrontation with racist views, we
come to have a lively and deep understanding of the meaning of
equality. If society could suppress all public expression of racist views,
the result would not be to strengthen our conviction in equality but
rather to weaken it. Let us further assume that racist views are unrea-
sonable and that no fully rational and reasonable person would affirm
them given full information and an opportunity for due reflection. It
does not follow that no value exists in allowing unreasonable citizens
to express their unreasonable views. Liberty of conscience will inevita-
bly produce some unreasonable beliefs, and respect for the autonomy
of all citizens requires the freedom to express such beliefs.
None of this implies that hate speech may not be regulated or
that R.A. V v. City of St. Paul120 was correctly decided. Even a partial
exploration of these topics is outside the scope of this review, but it is
clear that some racist speech is harassment, that some racist speech
does direct injury, and that some racist speech constitutes coercion
and intimidation. My point simply is that we should not ground our
justifications for the regulation of hate speech on premises that would
justify the prohibition of all racist ideas. We should not lose sight of
Shiffrin's fundamental premise: the value of dissent is incalculably
large.
Steven Shiffrin's Dissent, Injustice, and the Meanings of America is an
important book. It makes important contributions to the develop-
ment of First Amendment doctrine and further develops Shiffrin's dis-
sent-based theory of the freedom of speech. Shiffrin's book surely will
generate discussion, disagreement, and dissent, but even those who
reject its conclusion will see the freedom of speech in new ways. Dis-
sent, Injustice, and the Meanings of America is a must read for every seri-
ous student of the First Amendment.
118 Id.
119 From the point of view of political liberalism, we might say that racist speech denies
the fundamental equality of citizens and hence is inconsistent with the premise that all
reasonable citizens can reach agreement through the use of public reason.
120 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
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